INTRODUCTION
In recent years game theory has received substantial attention. In applications of game theory [1] [2] [3] [4] , a first step is to model the real world cases as precisely as possible. Currently cooperative games, non-cooperative games, and constant-sum games are used to describe real-world situations.
Game models which utilize only one of cooperation, noncooperation and adversary models are called ideal game models. However, there are cases "lying between" noncooperative games and cooperative games. In these "nonideal" cases, there exists more than one kind of factors among non-cooperation, cooperation, and adversary models. Imperfect coordination among UAVs, or cooperation benefit/risk among companies/countries might result in this category of game models. Experiences and instincts are used to choose the closest ideal game model, and then apply the corresponding game theory. In this way, the main part is taken and some useful information may be discarded.
Unfortunately, sometimes the discarded non-mainstream information can lead to very different results. We use the following two prisoner's dilemma game tables to illustrate the importance of discarded non-mainstream information.
Example 1 Game Table 1 (for game 1) and Game Table 1 (for game 2) are logic-homogeneous. According to current game theories, for both games, cell 1 is always the noncooperative solution, and cell 4 is always the Transferable Utility (TU) cooperative solution. When traditional game theory is used to analyze the two games, exactly the same suggestions for the two games will be obtained. But appealing to common sense, in game 2, for both players, the inducement for non-cooperation is very large and the cooperation risk is very small when compared with game 1. In real world situations, two ordinary friends will be more likely to reach cell 1 in game 2 compared with the case when they are in game 1. Table 1 Smaller inducement for non-cooperation 21 22 P2 =20000 P22 =10001
(cell 3) (cell 4) This implies that there might be some important factor that has not been modeled by current game theories, causing users to instinctively distinguish between these two games while current game models could not. The factor is the information discarded by ideal game models, which are mainly based on logistics. Since 3.0001 > 3 and 300000 > 3 are exactly the same from the perspective of logistics, existing ideal game models discard the information about the large difference between the numbers.
The "coupling game model" (CGT) proposed in [6] A second application includes non-combatant civilians in battlefields. Civilians often play an active role in wars. They are not just passively static but might emotionally and/or purposefully take actions to help one side in a battle. This is to say, they can make choices like a game player, too. Unfortunately, existing two-player (Blue and Red) game theoretic models [5, [8] [9] [10] ] usually do not consider this situation, even though collateral damage has been considered in a paper on a two-player game model [20] . Extending such two-player models to three-player (Blue, Red, and White civilian) game model can capture more battlefield information and analyze more complex situations. Since emotion and rationality will determine the civilian player' attitudes toward Blue or Red, which can be modeled as coupling factors in a multi-player coupling game. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will summarize the basic idea of coupling game theory. Section 3 describes the two approaches to the estimation problem of coupling factors. Section 4 provides sensitivity analysis on coupling factors. Section 5 discusses the experimental results and explanations. Section 6 has conclusions for the paper. (2) After removing any individual column (2) in Qd , the remaining matrix is still full rank
TECHNICAL APPROACH
then for any cell of the original game array, there always exist at least one D-player rational coupling factor matrix W, such that the corresponding cell in the transformed game is a non-cooperative coupling game (NCCG) equilibrium.
In some cases, a higher social payoff [12] in a game can be guaranteed by a higher set of coupling factors. That is to say, under some conditions better cooperation can guarantee higher social payoff. This is stated by the following rational cooperation theorem. 
where k is the index of time step. jB (k) and jR(k) are the normalized payoff functions being maximizing by Blue and
Red (the labels of two fighting forces), respectively. Bf (k) and Under such situations, civilians are slightly adversarial to US force and not exactly "neutral". Although US forces know this perfectly, US forces cannot treat them as enemies due to social-political-military constraints. However, US forces should at least be able to consider the effect of courses of actions (COAs) of such "slightly adversarial civilian" and base decision-making on the combination of COAs from both enemy and such civilians. In other words, a more accurate tool should be developed to model neutral civilian as a "White" player and considering the coupling between civilian's actions and Blue/Red payoffs. This will allow Blue player to make decisions on a more comprehensive and accurate background and greatly reduce unnecessary losses. Based on the above argument, a more accurate model for such a scenario might be a 3-player game represented by (8)
where JW(k) is the payoff of the civilian player and the civilian player also deserves an input set uw(k). In this way, civilians are treated as a player that is at the same level with two opposing forces, which are often labeled as Blue (Force) and Red (Force).
In addition, as many researchers [22] [23] [24] 
where the "c" in superscript stands for "comprehensive". 
SIMULATIONS
We experimented with the two estimation approaches for two types of scenarios, respectively. The first application scenario describes an imperfect cooperation among team UAVs. In a battlefield there will be high-value but harder targets which need more than one UAV to coordinate to destroy, and there will be low-value but easier targets which need only one UAV to destroy. When perfect coordination does not exist, the UAVs will face situations similar to prisoner's dilemmas stated in Table 3 (maximizing the payoffs). The non-cooperative equilibrium is Cell 1, which will be reached by applying traditional non-cooperative game theory. The TU cooperative equilibrium is Cell 9, which is best and will be reached by applying traditional TU cooperative game theory. However, if a player wishes to use TU cooperative game theory to reach cell 9 it will experience the risk of Since the plots are relatively small, we clarify the labels on them: 1) the labels of horizontal axis are "time"; 2) the labels of vertical axis are "team value"; 3) The titles are "Emotional-Rational scope". In Fig. 4 
